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2.1  Introduction 
Among the advanced economies, the European countries face a youth 
employment crisis. Over the period  1970-94  the average unemployment 
rate for youths aged 15-24  in the 11 European countries studied in this 
paper rose by over 16 percentage points (from 4.2 to 20.6 percent), while 
the average unemployment rate for adults aged 25-54  rose from 1.6 to 9.7 
percent.’ In contrast, in the United  States in this period the youth un- 
employment rate rose from 11.0 to 12.5  percent, and the adult rate from 3.4 
to 5 percent. Over the same period, the average youth employment rate in 
these  European  countries  fell from  59 to 41  percent,  while  adult  em- 
ployment rates were generally flat or increasing. The deterioration of the 
youth labor market has been particularly severe in Finland, France, Ireland, 
Italy, Spain, and Sweden. The poor performance of the labor market for 
youths is in part due to aggregate cyclical fluctuations, with the most re- 
cent sharp increases in youth unemployment and decreases in youth em- 
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1. The 11 European countries are Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Nether- 
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mated using the first and last observations available on each country in the sample period, 
which are not always in  1970 and 1994, as explained below. We also use data on the United 
States, Canada, Australia, and Japan. 
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ployment in some countries (especially Finland and Sweden) likely to at 
least partly reverse course. However, the longer term trends suggest that 
the youth  employment  crisis goes beyond  cyclical changes and may  be 
symptomatic of more lasting changes, such as those that have affected the 
wage structure, favoring the more highly educated over those with fewer 
“skills,’’ including favoring older workers over younger, less experienced 
workers, This concern raises the obvious question of what  steps, if  any, 
might be taken to ease the youth employment crisis. 
Rather than focusing on policies to address youth employment prob- 
lems, the purpose of this paper is to assess the evidence on the contribu- 
tion of changes in the population age structure to the changing fortunes 
of youths in the labor market over the 1970s, 1980s, and early 1990s, and 
to use this evidence to project the likely effects of future cohort sizes on 
youth labor markets. This is intended to serve as a backdrop for broader 
labor  market  policy  questions,  by  providing  evidence  on the extent  to 
which youth labor market problems may be ameliorated by demographic 
change. A casual reading of the evidence provides little cause for optimism 
that demographic developments-in  particular,  projected declines in the 
size of young cohorts-will  improve youth labor markets. Many countries 
experienced baby busts in the 1960s that produced relatively small entering 
cohorts in the 1980s and 1990s. For example, the ratio of the youth popu- 
lation to the adult population fell from 0.43 to 0.29 in the United States 
and from 0.51 to 0.28 in Finland from 1970 to 1994, while falling from 
0.48 to 0.30 in the Netherlands from 1971 to 1994. These changes in the 
population age structure should have improved the labor market position 
of youths relative to older adults, as long as younger  and older workers 
are not perfect  substitutes in production.  However, this period brought 
continuing deterioration  of the youth  labor  market  in many countries, 
rather than improvement. Why did youths do so poorly during a period 
when they became more scarce? One possible explanation is that the ef- 
fects of changes in demand for young workers in this period due to down- 
turns in the business cycle, technological changes, and changing patterns 
of international trade swamped the beneficial effects of supply-side changes. 
To some extent, this appears to be the case, because our results ultimately 
suggest that the independent effect of declines in relative youth cohort size 
is to improve the youth labor market. 
We first review the recent literature on the effects of cohort size on labor 
market outcomes of youths. We then provide  a descriptive overview of 
changes in population structure and youth labor markets. Following that, 
we turn to estimates of a series of regression models that attempt to isolate 
the effects of exogenous changes in potential youth labor supply on youth 
employment and unemployment rates, using a panel data set for 15 coun- 
tries over more than 20 years. 
Although there is a large literature in this area, we  offer a number of Cohort Crowding and Youth Labor Markets  59 
innovations,  as well  as new  information.  First,  we  use a cross-national 
time-series  sample that extends into the 1990s. This sample allows us to 
take advantage of variation across countries in the timing and magnitude 
of changes in youth cohort sizes to estimate cohort size effects, to better 
isolate the effects of cohort size from general trends that may have affected 
all  young  people  during this  period  (e.g.,  rising  relative  demand  for 
skilled labor). 
Second, we address problems of potential bias from endogenous deter- 
mination of relative youth cohort size in a country. In particular, we cor- 
rect  for the influence of endogenous migration decisions of youths and 
adults by using lagged births as an instrument for our measure of relative 
cohort size (the ratio of the youth population to the adult population). 
Third, we  estimate models  that allow  cohort size effects to vary  ac- 
cording to the state of the macroeconomy, examining whether economies 
with tighter aggregate labor markets are able to absorb large cohorts more 
readily than those with slack aggregate labor markets. 
Fourth, we carry out a variety of specification tests and sensitivity anal- 
yses, focusing on the specification of the error term, possible correlations 
between omitted variables and relative cohort size, and the appropriate dy- 
namics. 
Fifth, we relate the institutional features of labor markets to responses 
to population change. In particular, we focus on the effects of centraliza- 
tion in wage setting and the influence of policies (such as unemployment 
benefits) that may affect wage adjustments or the allocation of labor. We 
find some evidence, although it is statistically weak, to suggest that labor 
market  institutions  that decrease  flexibility  lead  to greater  response  of 
youth unemployment  and employment rates to fluctuations in youth co- 
hort size. 
The results are somewhat sensitive to alterations in estimation and spec- 
ification, so the choice of estimation strategy affects the conclusions. Our 
preferred estimates indicate that large youth cohorts lead to large increases 
in the relative unemployment rate of youths, with elasticities as high as 0.5 
or 0.6. On the other hand, we  find little effect of relative cohort size on 
relative employment rates of youths. 
Finally, we  carry out a series of projections.  Due to recent  drops in 
fertility,  several European countries  (especially  Ireland,  Italy,  Portugal, 
and Spain), as well as Japan, will experience marked reductions in the size 
of youth cohorts over the next 16 years. Projected declines of youth shares 
should  improve  youth  labor markets  in  these  countries,  although  the 
effects are not large compared with longer term changes in youth unem- 
ployment  rates. Moreover,  for countries that have experienced slack de- 
mand (reflected in rising adult unemployment rates), the improvements in 
youth labor markets from declining youth cohort sizes are small relative 
to the improvements  that could  be  gained  from increases in  economic 60  Sanders Korenman and David Neumark 
activity that reduce adult unemployment rates to earlier levels. Other coun- 
tries cannot expect demographic changes to improve youth labor markets 
since youth  population  shares  are projected  to decline moderately  (the 
United States, Finland, France, the Netherlands, and Australia) or to in- 
crease (Germany, Norway,  Sweden, the United Kingdom, and Canada). 
Thus population change will probably do relatively little to reduce youth 
employment problems in the advanced economies. 
2.2  Previous Literature on Cohort Size and Youth Labor Markets 
In this section we review the literature on the effects of cohort size, with 
an emphasis on recent research. Although the empirical research in this pa- 
per examines effects on youth employment and unemployment only, our re- 
view also covers studies that estimate effects of relative cohort size on wages, 
in part because the employment and unemployment effects that we  study 
may depend in part on wage changes induced by demographic changes. 
Bloom, Freeman, and Korenman (1987) summarize 18 studies of the ef- 
fects of cohort size on labor markets for youths. All the studies they review 
present evidence of some adverse effects of own cohort size on the relative 
wages or employment of youth. They conclude that “despite differences 
across studies, two clear areas of agreement  emerge.  First, in  the U.S., 
Canada, and Israel,  the entry  of relatively large cohorts into the labor 
market did result in a decline in the earnings of those cohorts relative to 
the earnings of older, smaller cohorts. Second, the labor market entry of 
large  cohorts tended  to result  in  increased  relative  unemployment  in 
most countries.” 
Most studies have relied on time-series variation in cohort size to esti- 
mate cohort size effects. Very few studies have taken advantage of cross- 
national  variation  in  the size and timing  of demographic  fluctuations. 
Many studies note that there is potential confounding of cohort (size) and 
various period effects, especially those related to the business cycle (Fair 
and Dominguez  1991; Borsch-Supan  1993). The confounding of period 
and cohort effects is a particular concern in samples that cover short peri- 
ods, and in those in which  variation  in cohort size is limited or where 
cohort size is trending smoothly. 
The potential  value  of  examining  cross-national  variation  in  demo- 
graphic cycles is obvious. For example, in the United States the period 
1973-84  was one of economic stagnation ending with a severe recession. 
Youths who reached  age 20 between  1973 and 1984 were born between 
1953 and 1964, a period containing the peak and trailing end of the U.S. 
baby boom. It is difficult with time-series evidence alone to determine the 
relative importance of two explanations of the labor market problems ex- 
perienced by these baby boom cohorts in their youth: large cohort size 
and poor aggregate economic conditions at the time of labor market entry Cohort Crowding and Youth Labor Markets  61 
(Fair and Dominguez 1991). However, fertility fluctuations were of differ- 
ent magnitudes and occurred at different times in different countries. As 
a result, fluctuations in labor supply due to the entry of young cohorts 
into the labor market also took place at different times. If cohort crowding 
is responsible for the adverse outcomes for large cohorts, then large co- 
horts  should  have  poor  outcomes  in  all  economic  environments.  The 
cross-national approach should therefore provide a better test of the co- 
hort crowding hypothesis. 
Bloom et al. (1987) also conduct original analyses of a pooled cross- 
country cross-year  sample. This is the only  study we  are aware of  that 
takes advantage  of  cross-national  variation  in  cohort sizes to estimate 
their effects.2 (In the present  paper, we are able to use data for a longer 
sample period, which exploits variation  in cohort size in the 1980s and 
early 1990s produced by the baby bust in several countries in our data set.) 
Bloom et al. find that the expected relative wage (defined as the product 
of earnings and the employment rate) is lower for large cohorts. They also 
find evidence of a trade-off  between  relative employment  and earnings: 
large youth cohorts experienced  depressed earnings (e.g., in the United 
States) or increased relative unemployment rates (e.g., in Europe). Large 
youth cohorts appear to have been absorbed in all major industries, not 
simply through the expansion of youth-intensive  industries,  such as the 
service sector. 
Bloom et al. also examine whether, in the United  States, labor market 
disadvantages experienced  in youth by large cohorts are permanent, by 
tracking the progress of large cohorts using the 1969-84  Current Popula- 
tion Surveys. They present evidence that the baby boom cohorts were able 
to “catch up,” partly in relative wages, and completely in relative unem- 
ployment rates, within about a decade of labor market entry. Nonetheless, 
even though large cohorts may eventually obtain the economic status of 
smaller cohorts, large cohorts have lower lifetime wealth due to earnings 
lost during the catch-up period. 
Several recent studies of cohort size effects have taken up the following 
questions (some of which were also discussed in earlier literature): 
1. Do the same patterns of cohort size effects found mostly in studies 
of the United States appear in data for other countries? 
2.  Do the effects of cohort size on wages or employment persist? 
3. How do demographic fluctuations (the size of own and surrounding 
cohorts) affect the shape of age-earnings or experience-earnings profiles? 
How do they affect investment in human capital? 
4.  Are cohort size effects larger for the more educated members of co- 
horts? 
2. OECD (1980) presents separate models for 10 countries. 62  Sanders Korenman and David Neumark 
The findings from many of these recent studies are summarized in table 
2.1  .3 Although researchers examine different aspects of cohort size effects 
on young workers using different samples and estimation techniques, it is 
possible  to offer a  tentative  synthesis with  respect  to these questions. 
There seems to be evidence of an adverse effect of cohort size on youth 
unemployment,  employment, and wages  across a number  of countries. 
There is also some consensus about the persistence of such effects; esti- 
mates run from partial to nearly full catch-up. Several authors predict that 
cohort size effects may differ depending on a cohort’s “position” in the 
demographic  cycle, although the evidence  for this proposition  is more 
mixed. Cohort size effects do appear to be stronger for more educated 
workers.  In addition to these findings,  there  is  also speculation  based 
mainly on indirect evidence that the adverse effects of large cohort size are 
smaller for cohorts that happen to enter the labor market during favorable 
demand conditions. Finally, some authors have expressed concerns about 
endogeneity of relative cohort size due to various behavioral responses to 
cohort crowding such as migrating or delaying age of school leaving (when 
a relative labor force size variable is used), although this issue has not been 
adequately addressed. In the empirical work that follows, we consider evi- 
dence on many of these issues. 
2.3  Empirical Analysis 
2.3.1  Data 
Most of the data we  examine are from the United States, Canada, Aus- 
tralia, Japan, and the 11 European countries for which the OECD pub- 
lishes time-series data on the variables used in this study for most or all of 
the period 1970-94.4 The majority of the data on population, unemploy- 
ment, and employment rates are from Labor Force Statistics, Part 111 and 
Employment Outlook, July 1995: Statistical Annex, both published by the 
OECD.5  Population data for the United Kingdom prior to 1984 are from 
the Demographic Yearbook published by the United Nations. Employment 
and unemployment data for the United Kingdom prior to 1984 are from 
the aforementioned OECD sources and include only England and Wales 
(after 1984, the entire United Kingdom is included in the data). 
Youth ages are defined as 15-24,  with the following exceptions:  14-24 
3. A more detailed discussion of these studies is provided in the appendix. 
4. The exceptions are the former West Germany, 1970-93; Ireland, 1971, 1975, 1977, 1979, 
1981, and 1983-93;  Italy,  1970-93;  the Netherlands, 1971-94;  Norway, 1978-94;  Portugal, 
1974-93;  Spain, 1972-94;  and the United Kingdom, 1973, 1975-77,  and 1980-94.  We  also 
have much more limited data on youth enrollment rates, discussed below. 
5. The unemployment rates appear to be standardized unemployment rates. Leigh (1995, 
table 2.4) provides  some comparisons of  alternative unemployment  rate measures across 
some of the countries in our sample. Table 2.1  Summary of Literature Review 
Prediction for 
Study  Country  Outcomes  Larger Cohorts  Evidence 
Flaim (  1979) 
Flaim (1 990) 
Levine and Mitchell (1988) 
Nardone (1987) 
Fair and Dominguez 
(1991) 
Stapleton and Young 
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Steeper if surrounded by large 
cohorts; low earnings but steeper 
profiles if born before or after 
peak 
Confirmed 
Confirmed by fall in youth rate 
in  1980s 
Not confirmed 
Confirmed 
Not confirmed; small entering 
cohorts were hurt by early 1980s 
recession 
Not studied 
Confirmed for women, not men; 
income effect may dominate for 
men 
data 
Not confirmed by later aggregate 
Confirmed by  later aggregate data 
Confirmed in his data 
Not confirmed in later data: but 
demand factors may dominate 
supply in  198Os/199Os 
(continued) Table 2.1  (continued) 
Study  Country  Outcomes 
Prediction for 
Larger Cohorts  Evidence 
Flinn (1993)  United States 
Zimmermann (1991)  Germany, 
preunification 
Wright (1991)  Great Britain 
Hartog et al. (1993)  Netherlands 
Schmidt (1993)  Germany 
Nickell (1993)  Great Britain 
Klevmarken (1993)  Sweden 
Wages  Direct effect: lower return to human 
Indirect effect: increased human 
capital 
capital investment due to lower 
opportunity cost 
Following large cohorts is good due 
to low opportunity cost and high 
returns; leading a large cohort is 
bad due to high cost and low 
returns due to entry of large 
cohort soon to follow 
Older workers hurt by  large 
More depressed for more educated 
Age-specific  Higher in short run 
unemployment 
entry cohorts 
members of large cohorts 
Wages 
Wages  Lower wages and steeper 
Unemployment  Higher 
experience profiles 
Relative wage overall  Lower relative wages if market 
and in union 
sector 
conditions affect wages 
Wages  Lower wages and wage 
growth 
Simulations confirm negative but 
modest direct effects of  size of 
own cohort; small indirect effects 
Confirmed 
Possibly in long run 
Education differential is confirmed 
but overall effect of large cohort 
on wages is temporary 
Not confirmed 
Confirmed for a few age-sex 
groups, but adverse effects 
appear to fade with age 
Confirmed in both samples 
Not confirmed Cohort Crowding and Youth Labor Markets  65 
in Italy and 16-24  in the United States, Norway, Spain, Sweden, and the 
United Kingdom. Adult ages are defined as 25-54,  except for Italy, for 
which the range is 25-59.6  Relative cohort size is measured as (Population 
15-24)/(Population  25-54). 
GNP  figures are from  World Tables, published by the World Bank. The 
GNP growth rate is defined as 100 . (GNP, -  GNP ,-J  / GNP,-,. All of 
the figures are real values. The data series for the GNP growth rate are 
generally shorter than those for population and employment. These data 
are from 1975 through 1993 for most of the countries in the sample.’ 
Data for lagged births for the European countries are from International 
Historical Statistics: Europe, 1750-1988  (Mitchell  1992). The same data 
for the United States are from  Vital Statistics of the United States, 1991, 
published by  the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. Data 
for Japan and Australia come from International Historical Statistics: A$ 
rica, Asia and Oceania (Mitchell 1995).8 
Population  projections  are  taken  from  World  Population  Prospects, 
1994-95 Edition, published by the World Bank. The projections are made 
in five-year intervals, beginning in 1995; we  interpolate linearly to obtain 
estimates for each year. We have used the “medium-variant projections” 
from 2000 through 2010. 
2.3.2  Time-Series Evidence by Country 
Figure 2.1 displays data on relative youth cohort size for the 15 coun- 
tries in our data set from approximately 1970 through 1994. The informa- 
tion displayed to the left of the 1994 vertical line is the actual data, while 
that to  the right of the 1994 vertical line is projections, discussed in greater 
detail below. Looking first at the population share or relative cohort size 
variable, we see that the United States, Canada, Germany, Ireland, Portu- 
gal, and the United Kingdom experienced baby booms followed by busts, 
reflected in relative youth cohort sizes about 20 years later. Other coun- 
tries-Finland,  France, the Netherlands, Australia, and to some extent 
Sweden and Norway-have  experienced fairly steady declines in the rela- 
6. We use a relatively young cutoff to avoid the influence of changes in retirement policy 
or behavior that might have substantial effects on 55-64-year-olds. However, the results were 
not sensitive to using a wider age range. 
7. The remaining countries have data as follows: Ireland, 1985-93; Norway, 1980-93; Por- 
tugal, 1976-93;  and the United Kingdom, 1977 and 1982-93. 
8. The estimation of lagged births is best illustrated  by  an example. We  are interested in 
knowing how many  16-24-year-olds in  1970 were born in the United  States. Births  16-24 
year earlier (in the period 1946-54) will not include respondents who were born in 1945 but 
have not yet reached their birthdays (and so are still age 24). Similarly, this method would 
include some of the people born in 1954 who have not turned age 16 by  the survey date. In 
the absence of information about the date of birth  and survey date, we  use the expected 
value of these dates (1 July) and so include one-half of 1945 births and exclude one-half of 
1954 births. The age ranges for lagged births are chosen  to match  the age ranges  in the 
population and employment data (which, as noted above, vary slightly across countries). 66  Sanders Korenman and David Neumark 
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Youth population shares with data through 1994 and projections 
tive sizes of youth cohorts. Finally, in Italy and Spain there is no discern- 
ible trend, while Japan exhibits a sharp decline followed by a modest in- 
crease in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Based on the declines in relative 
youth cohort sizes over the latter part of the sample period (for all coun- 
tries except Italy, Spain, and Japan), if smaller cohorts increase labor mar- 
ket prospects for young workers, then we  should have seen higher youth 
employment  rates and lower youth  unemployment rates in recent years. 
Moreover, youth cohorts are projected to shrink in relative size for many 
of the countries-especially  Ireland,  Italy,  Portugal,  Spain, and Japan. 
Thus the cohort crowding hypothesis would suggest future improvements 
in youth labor markets in these countries. 
However, data on youth unemployment and employment rates, depicted 
in figures 2.2 and 2.3 (displayed along with data on relative cohort sizes), 
raise doubts about the cohort crowding  hypothesis.  Figure 2.2, for ex- 
ample, shows youth unemployment rates (indicated by circles; population 
shares are indicated  by solid lines). In some countries with  declining or 
steady relative youth cohort sizes, youth unemployment rates rose steadily 
throughout the sample period (France and Ireland) or jumped toward the 
end of the period (Finland, Sweden, and to a lesser extent Australia and 
Canada). Similar phenomena are reflected in the youth employment rates 
displayed  in figure 2.3. More generally, what  we  expect  to see in  these 
figures, if the cohort crowding hypothesis holds, is that (all else the same) 
youth unemployment rates and relative cohort sizes move in the same di- 
rection, whereas youth employment rates and relative cohort sizes move 
in opposite directions. With respect to unemployment, this prediction ap- 
pears to be contradicted for Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Norway, Cohort Crowding and Youth Labor Markets  67 
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Fig. 2.2  Youth unemployment rates and population shares 
Fig. 2.3  Youth employment rates and population shares 
Australia, and Canada, and for the early part of the sample period for the 
Netherlands. With respect to employment, this prediction appears to be 
contradicted  for  nearly  all  countries  with  the exceptions  of  Germany, 
Spain, and the United Kingdom, as well  as the Netherlands in the late 
part of the sample period. 
Of course, relative youth cohort size is not the only variable affecting 
youth  unemployment  and employment rates. Aggregate demand effects 
are likely to be important. In the regression estimates discussed below, we 68  Sanders Korenman and David Neumark 
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Fig. 2.4  Relative youth unemployment rates and population shares 
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Fig. 2.5  Relative youth employment rates and population shares 
include aggregate demand controls. In figures 2.4 and 2.5, we foreshadow 
the results by showing ratios of the youth unemployment or employment 
rate to the corresponding adult rate. These ratios will reduce the influence 
of aggregate changes that are also reflected in the adult rates, although 
they will not eliminate all aggregate influences, because youth unemploy- 
ment and employment rates are more cyclically sensitive (Clark and Sum- 
mers 1982). The relative unemployment rates graphed in figure 2.4 exhibit 
smaller  movements;  notably,  the sharp increases  in the unemployment Cohort Crowding and Youth Labor Markets  69 
rates in the past few years in Finland and Sweden, and the increase over 
a longer period in Spain, are not reflected in the unemployment rate ratios, 
suggesting that aggregate developments are an important contributor to 
changes in youth unemployment.  Figure 2.4 appears to provide a little 
more support for the cohort crowding hypothesis, because relative youth 
unemployment rates and cohort sizes move in the same direction for more 
countries and longer sample subperiods. In contrast, the relative employ- 
ment rates in figure 2.5 display time-series behavior similar to the absolute 
rates  in  figure 2.3,  generally  reflecting worsening  youth  labor  markets 
coupled with declining youth cohort sizes. 
2.3.3  Intervening Role of Schooling 
It is possible, however, that the employment declines in figure 2.5 reflect 
trends in schooling or other labor market alternatives and therefore do  not 
necessarily represent a social problem. Of course, it is difficult to untangle 
increased enrollment  for exogenous  reasons  from increased enrollment 
that is spurred by  slack labor markets for youths (for reasons other than 
demographic  developments, which  should  have  improved  youth  labor 
markets in many countries). Although this paper does not provide a de- 
tailed  analysis  of the relationships  between  youth  enrollment,  employ- 
ment, and unemployment and demographic change, a cursory look at the 
evidence is nonetheless instructive. 
Figure 2.6 plots relative youth cohort sizes and enrollment rates, based 
on  school  enrollment data for  a subset of the countries for which the 
OECD has made such data a~ailable.~  For the countries included in figure 
2.6, those in which relatively strong declines in youth cohort size were not 
accompanied by increases in either the relative or absolute youth employ- 
ment rate include France, Ireland, Portugal, and to a lesser extent Austra- 
lia (see figs. 2.3 and 2.5). Figure 2.6 shows, however, that all four of these 
countries had rather steep increases in enrollment rates in the period for 
which data are available. At the same time,  among countries in  which 
youth employment  rates and cohort sizes do appear to have a negative 
association, including Germany, Spain, the United Kingdom, the Nether- 
lands, and to a lesser extent the United States and Canada, most had small 
increases in enrollment rates (the United States, Germany, the Nether- 
lands, and the United Kingdom). Thus failure to account for sources of 
change in enrollment rates that in turn affect employment rates may help 
9. These data were constructed by  the OECD and supplied to us by  David Blanchflower 
and Richard Freeman. For eight countries, actual enrollment rates for 16-24-year-olds are 
available. For these countries and three additional ones, enrollment rates by single-year ages 
and by  sex are available, although we  do not have the population  weights at this level of 
disaggregation. We therefore report the average over all  16-24-year-olds of these disaggre- 
gated rates, which is equivalent to a fixed-weight enrollment rate. For the eight countries for 
which the true rates are available, the series are almost identical. 70  Sanders Korenman and David Neumark 
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Fig. 2.7  Youth enrollment rates and employment rates 
to explain the apparent lack of evidence for a negative relationship be- 
tween youth employment rates and relative cohort sizes. 
As additional evidence, figure 2.7 plots youth enrollment rates and em- 
ployment rates. It is the case that some countries with steep declines in 
youth employment also experienced sharp increases in youth enrollment. 
However, it is not true that youth enrollment rates simply reflect the re- 
verse of youth employment rates. While youth enrollment and employ- 
ment rates generally moved in opposite directions, there are contrary oc- 
currences, as in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands. Below, we look 
briefly at the implications of changes in enrollment rates within the regres- 
sion  framework  in  which  we  analyze the  cohort crowding  hypothesis 
more thoroughly. 
Of course, nothing in this analysis says that the changes in youth enroll- 
ment rates were exogenous and therefore "explain"  the failure of youth Cohort Crowding and Youth Labor Markets  71 
employment rates to conform to the cohort crowding hypothesis. The data 
are equally consistent with youth employment rates falling in some coun- 
tries despite declining youth cohort sizes, and with enrollment rates rising 
in response to poor labor market prospects. Attempting to untangle the 
causality is a task for future research. 
2.3.4  Grouping Countries by History of Cohort Size Changes 
In the next set of figures (2.8-2.1 l), we  aggregate countries according 
to their  decade-by-decade changes  in  age  structure. The countries  are 
grouped into three categories for the 1970s and then for the 1980s and 
beginning of the 1990s: those in which a baby boom cohort reached youth 
ages, those in which a baby bust cohort reached these ages, and those with 
little trend in relative youth cohort size.’O Figures 2.8 through 2.11 display, 
respectively, youth unemployment rates, relative (youth/adult) youth un- 
employment  rates,  youth employment rates, and relative youth employ- 
ment rates for the six groups of countries. According to  the cohort crowd- 
ing hypothesis,  youth  labor market  outcomes  should  deteriorate  more 
(improve less) in periods when youth cohorts are increasing in size as com- 
pared to periods when they are decreasing in size or there is little variation 
in youth cohort size. 
Consistent with the hypothesis, countries where  a baby boom cohort 
entered the labor market in the 1970s experienced larger increases in youth 
unemployment  than those where there was a baby  bust cohort or little 
trend in cohort size (first row of graphs in fig. 2.8). Similarly, in the 1980s 
and 1990s countries in which a baby bust cohort entered the labor market 
experienced smaller increases in youth unemployment than countries with 
little trend, although the one country (Japan) in which a baby boom co- 
hort entered did not experience  a sharper rise in youth  unemployment 
(second row of fig. 2.8, looking to the right of the vertical lines). Figure 
2.9 shows the relative unemployment rates for the same set of countries. 
Here, too, the evidence is generally consistent  with the cohort crowding 
hypothesis,  at least as regards the comparison  between  boom and bust 
countries.  For example, in the 1970s relative youth unemployment rates 
rose considerably more for those countries in which a boom cohort en- 
tered the labor market, compared with those in which a bust cohort en- 
tered. 
Figures 2.10 and 2.1 1 turn to youth employment  rates.  Here, there is 
10. These are defined, respectively, as whether relative cohort size grew by  .04 or more, 
fell by  .04 or more, or changed by  an intermediate amount. In the  1970s, the countries in 
the “boom” category include Germany, Spain, and the United Kingdom. Those in the “bust” 
category  include  Finland,  France,  the  Netherlands,  Sweden, and Japan.  All  others  are 
grouped in the category exhibiting little trend. For the  1980s and early  1990s, the boom 
countries include Japan only, while the bust countries include the United States, Finland, 
France, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom, Austra- 
lia, and Canada. a,  +-  m 
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much less evidence consistent with cohort crowding. In the 1970s employ- 
ment  rates  (or  relative  employment  rates)  declined  for boom and bust 
countries, although more so for the former. In the 1980s and early 1990s, 
however, youth employment rates (relative or absolute) rose for the boom 
countries  and fell for the other  countries,  inconsistent  with  the cohort 
crowding hypothesis. 
2.3.5  Interpretation 
The data displayed in figures 2.2 through 2.11 lead to some tentative 
conclusions.  First,  youth  unemployment  rates  appear  to  respond  to 
changes in the relative sizes of youth cohorts in ways predicted by the co- 
hort crowding hypothesis. On the other hand, youth employment rates ap- 
pear at least sometimes to move in the opposite direction, falling as rela- 
tive cohort sizes decline, or are unrelated to relative cohort sizes. 
If wages are completely flexible, and the substitution effect dominates, 
then the employment  rate should fall in response to the entry of  a large 
cohort. Total employment of youths should increase, but at the lower equi- 
librium wage the employment rate should be lower as more youths choose 
not to work."  On the other hand, unemployment of youths should not 
necessarily increase, at least insofar as the unemployment rate reflects in- 
voluntary  unemployment.  The results  for both unemployment  and em- 
ployment  appear to be inconsistent  with  this characterization  of  labor 
markets for youths and the effects of cohort size. In contrast, if wages are 
rigid,  or, alternatively,  there is a fixed stock of jobs for youths, then  in 
response  to the entry of a large youth  cohort, the employment  rate of 
youths should fall (more sharply than if wages are flexible) and the unem- 
11. Given that we are studying employment and not hours, it is natural to assume that the 
substitution effect dominates. In a static model, the wage exerts only a substitution effect on 
the labor force participation decision. 74  Sanders Korenman and David Neumark 
ployment rate should rise.” The evidence in figures 2.2 through 2.11 ap- 
pears to be consistent with the rigid wage characterization with respect to 
unemployment  rates, but not employment rates. 
In fact, we  expect that the reality is somewhere between these two ex- 
tremes, which is why we expect large youth cohorts to increase youth un- 
employment  rates  and to decrease  youth  employment  rates.  Below,  we 
look more closely at country differences in the response of youth unem- 
ployment  and employment  to demographic  shifts and attempt to link 
these responses to institutional characteristics of labor markets related to 
the flexibility of wages. First, though, we turn to a more systematic analy- 
sis of the panel data set. 
2.3.6  Analyzing the Panel Data 
standard in the literature, in particular 
We begin  by  presenting  estimates of  specifications that  are relatively 
YE,, =  RCS*,P  + AE,,y + D,,6 + E,,, 
where i indexes country, f indexes year, and all variables are in logarithms. 
YE  is the log of either the youth unemployment rate or the youth employ- 
ment  rate, defined as the rate for  15-24-year-olds  (for most  countries). 
RCS is the log relative cohort size. We include different cyclical controls, 
including the log adult unemployment rate, the log adult employment rate, 
or other measures; these are denoted AE.  l3 D is a vector of dummy vari- 
ables capturing the timing of changes in the definitions of various series 
in the data set, some described in the data section and others of a more 
technical nature indicated in the original data sources. 
We interpret equation (1)  as a reduced-form employment rate or unem- 
ployment  rate equation, with the adult unemployment  and employment 
variables capturing demand influences and the relative cohort size variable 
capturing supply influences. Assuming that workers of different ages are 
imperfectly  substitutable,  and controlling for  demand  shifts,  larger co- 
12. One could argue that the implications for unemployment are more ambiguous because 
the unemployment rate depends on the decisions of individuals to remain in the labor force. 
Singell and Lillydahl(l989)  provide a summary of this issue and other problems with respect 
to the measurement and interpretation of youth unemployment rates. 
13. Note that once we include the adult rate corresponding to the youth rate on the left- 
hand side (e.g., the adult  unemployment  rate on the right-hand  side of the equation for 
the youth unemployment rate), the specification is essentially identical to one in which the 
dependent variable is the log of the youth rate relative to the adult rate. In particular, the 
estimate of p is unaffected by  the form of the dependent variable used. This follows because 
the variables are entered in  logs. To  see this, note that eq. (I),  when AE is  the log adult 
unemployment rate and RE is the log of the youth unemployment rate relative to the adult 
unemployment rate, can be written as 
RE,, =  RCS,,P +  AE,,(y - 1)  + D,,8 +  &,,. Cohort Crowding and Youth Labor Markets  75 
horts face lower wages. When the dependent variable is the youth employ- 
ment rate, the cohort crowding hypothesis predicts that p is negative. In 
contrast, when the dependent variable is instead the relative unemploy- 
ment rate, the cohort crowding hypothesis predicts that p is positive. 
2.3.7  Basic Regression Results 
In table 2.2 we present estimates of the effects of relative youth cohort 
size on youth unemployment and employment rates, focusing on the ap- 
propriate specification of the error term in  equation (1).  We control for 
adult unemployment and employment rates. Panel A reports OLS esti- 
mates in which we  treat the error term  E  as orthogonal to the regressors 
and independently  (and identically)  distributed both within  and across 
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Nofe:  N = 342 in panels A through C. N  =320 in panel D. All variables are expressed in log form. The 
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countries.  Larger relative  youth  cohort size is  associated  with  a higher 
relative youth unemployment rate, as predicted  by  the cohort crowding 
hypothesis, although the estimated coefficient is small (.035) and not sta- 
tistically  significant. Larger relative youth  cohort size is also associated 
with a higher relative youth employment rate (with the effect statistically 
significant), inconsistent with the cohort crowding hypothesis. 
In panel B we  consider the inclusion of common country components 
in the error, reporting estimates from specifications with country-specific 
fixed effects. It seems plausible that there are country-specific factors (al- 
though they  are  not necessarily  time  invariant)  that  influence  relative 
youth unemployment and employment rates.  I4  In comparison to the OLS 
estimates in panel A, the fixed-effect estimates indicate a much larger and 
significant positive effect of cohort size on the youth unemployment rate, 
and a much smaller positive effect on the youth employment rate.15 
We next add fixed year effects, in panel C, maintaining the fixed country 
effect specifications. Figure 2.3, discussed above, shows a downward trend 
in the youth employment rate in many countries that will be captured by 
the year  dummy variables.  The inclusion  of fixed year  effects has little 
impact on the estimated equation for the youth unemployment rate, as the 
estimated effect of relative cohort size is still positive and significant, with 
an elasticity of 0.29. However, the estimated effect of relative cohort size 
on the youth employment rate becomes negative (and significant), as pre- 
dicted by the cohort crowding hypothesis, with an elasticity of -0.1  1 .I6 
Thus a plausible  specification  that  appears to be consistent with  the 
data (conditional on the specification  of the observable variables) pro- 
duces evidence consistent with the cohort crowding hypothesis. Large rela- 
tive youth cohorts are associated with lower youth employment rates and 
higher youth unemployment rates. Given the results in panels A, B, and 
C, in  the remainder  of the paper  we  estimate specifications with  fixed 
country and fixed year effects. 
Finally, we estimate specifications accounting for serially correlated er- 
rors, as well as fixed country and year effects. Such serial correlation ren- 
ders the estimates in panel C inefficient and likely biases  the estimated 
14. E.g., the apprenticeship system in Germany is thought to be responsible for the rela- 
tively  low ratio of  youth  to adult unemployment  in that country (Sorrentino 1993),  and 
unemployment rates may systematically differ in some countries (such as Sweden) because 
of active labor market policies or other policy or measurement differences. 
15. We also computed estimates with random country effects. The resulting estimates were 
very similar to the fixed-effect estimates. Large changes in the coefficients in going from OLS 
to random effects indicate that the random-effect specification is inappropriate because the 
random-effect estimator is a weighted average of the within and the between estimator. Thus, 
although Hausman tests do not reject random effects in favor of fixed effects, we proceed 
with fixed country effects. 
16. In contrast, estimates with random year effects were little different from those in panel 
B. Hausman tests reject the random-effects specification in favor of fixed effects (in one case 
the p-value was  .OO;  in the other the matrix difference of  the variance-covariance matrices 
was not positive definite). Cohort Crowding and Youth Labor Markets  77 
standard errors downward. Panel D of table 2.2 reports estimates incorpo- 
rating an AR(1) process into the error term of equation  (I).’’  The esti- 
mated effect of relative cohort size on the youth unemployment  rate falls 
to .18, which, coupled with a sizable increase in the standard error, is not 
significant. In the equation for the youth employment rate, the sign of the 
estimated coefficient reverts to being positive, inconsistent with the cohort 
crowding hypothesis. The high estimated degree of autocorrelation in the 
data (with  the estimates of  the first-order  serial correlation  parameter 
ranging from .65 to 36) suggests that the AR(1) error specification is pre- 
ferred; we therefore maintain it in the analyses that follow.’8 
2.3.8 
In the next set of analyses we explore the importance of potential endo- 
geneity of the relative cohort size variable. In particular, the youth popula- 
tion (and to a lesser extent the adult population) may be endogenous if 
immigration flows respond to labor market conditions. In panel A of table 
2.3 we  address the endogeneity of the youth population by instrumenting 
for relative cohort size with the ratio of lagged births (i.e., births from the 
years in which the current youth cohort was born) to the adult popula- 
tion.IY  If we expect the currently resident youth population to be relatively 
larger when youth labor markets are doing well, then the relative cohort 
size variable will be positively correlated with the youth employment rate, 
biasing the estimate of p upward in the regressions for the employment 
rate. Similarly, the estimate of p would be biased downward in the regres- 
sions for the youth unemployment rate. 
In the first row of panel A, we see that in fact the estimated effect of rel- 
ative cohort size on the unemployment  rate becomes more positive, con- 
sistent with endogeneity bias, and is now statistically significant. Also con- 
sistent with endogeneity bias, in the second row the estimated coefficient 
of relative cohort size in the specification for the youth employment rate 
falls, although it remains positive (and becomes insignificant). 
In panel B of table 2.3, we  instrument using the lagged births variable 
only. On theoretical grounds, lagged births (only) is a better instrument 
Endogeneity of the Relative Cohort Size Variable 
17. We lose some observations (in addition to the first) because of breaks in the data series. 
The estimates for the smaller samples-not  accounting for serial correlation-were  very 
similar to those for the full sample. E.g., for the specification corresponding to the first row 
of panel C,  the estimate (standard error) of p was ,329 (.094); for the specification corre- 
sponding to the second row, it was -  ,127 (.050). 
18. The  qualitative results were similar when we introduced dynamics by including relative 
cohort size lagged one year (along with the contemporaneous value), instead of allowing for 
serial correlation, although the estimates of the individual coefficients were much less precise. 
In these specifications, however, significant serial correlation in the error remained. 
19. Other researchers have raised the endogeneity issue and, e.g., used population shares 
rather than labor force shares to measure cohort sizes. However, population shares are still 
affected by  endogenous migration. We are not aware of other attempts to remedy this prob- 
lem by  using lagged births as an instrument  for a  relative labor force or relative  cohort 
size variable. Table 2.3  Fixed Year and Country Effects Estimates Correcting for Serial Correlation and Instrumenting for Youth Population Share 
Independent Variables 
Adult  Adult 
Youth/Adult  Unemployment  Employment  Hausman Test 
Dependent Variable  Population  Rate  Rate  (  p-value)  P 
A.  Using lagged birthdadult population 
as an instrument 
Youth unemployment rate  .344** 
(.168) 
Youth employment rate  ,059 
(.087) 
B.  Using lagged births as an instrument 
Youth unemployment rate  .503** 
(.202) 










-  1.036**  .20  .65  1 
(.479) 
1.411**  .61  ,855 
(.181) 
-.946*  .I3  .651 
(.486) 
1.323**  .I 1  ,866 
(. 187) 
Note: N  = 318. All variables are expressed in log form. The Hausman tests are for the reported variables only (no dummies are included in the test). The 
data are from 1970 through 1994, although most of the countries do  not have data for all of the years. The regressions include dummy variables that account 
for changes in the data series for some countries. Two observations are lost relative to panel D of table 2.2 because of missing lagged births data for Japan. 
Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. 
*Significant at the 10 percent level. 
**Significant at the 5 percent level. Cohort Crowding and Youth Labor Markets  79 
for relative cohort size because it should not be affected by endogenous 
migration decisions of adults (or youths). The results are qualitatively con- 
sistent with  those in panel A, although  the effects of instrumenting are 
more profound. The estimated effect of relative cohort size on youth un- 
employment becomes stronger, while the estimated  effect on youth em- 
ployment becomes negative, although it is insignificant.20 
Although the Hausman tests tend not to lead to rejection of the exogen- 
eity of relative cohort size, the results of instrumenting are qualitatively 
different, with little increase in the standard errors. Thus we maintain the 
IV estimation in the following analyses. In our view, the lagged births in- 
strument is theoretically superior to the ratio of lagged births to the adult 
population (reflected also, perhaps, in the lower p-values, between .  10 and 
.15, from the Hausman test). Thus we retain this instrument in the follow- 
ing tables. 
Overall, consideration of the endogeneity  of relative cohort size leads 
to stronger evidence of cohort crowding effects on youth unemployment. 
In addition, it eliminates the anomalous positive effect of relative cohort 
size on the youth employment rate. 
2.3.9  Alternative Aggregate Demand Controls 
In table 2.4 we explore the sensitivity of our results to using a measure 
of the business cycle that is more exogenous with respect to labor market 
developments. After all, given some substitutability between younger and 
older  workers,  adult employment  and unemployment  rates  may  be  af- 
fected by the youth population share. In addition, other factors may affect 
youth employment or unemployment, which in turn may affect adult em- 
ployment  or unemployment,  although the endogeneity bias could prob- 
ably go in either direction.21  We therefore instead use the lagged growth 
rate of GNP (which was more strongly related to youth employment and 
unemployment  rates than was the contemporaneous growth rate, consis- 
tent with unemployment and employment being lagging indicators). The 
results are reported in panel A. 
The estimated effects of lagged GNP growth are consistent with expec- 
tations, as it has a negative effect on the youth unemployment rate and a 
positive effect on the youth employment rate. In the equation for the youth 
unemployment rate, the estimated effect of relative cohort size more than 
doubles, to 1.12, and remains statistically significant, while the estimated 
20. In all cases discussed in this section, the F-statistic for the instrument in the first-stage 
regression  was  huge, suggesting that small  sample  biases  are unlikely  to be  a  problem 
(Bound, Jaeger, and Baker 1995). 
21.  E.g., a higher minimum wage that reduces the employment rate for young workers 
may increase the employment rate for older workers toward whom employers substitute, 
leading to downward endogeneity bias in the estimated coefficient of the adult employment 
rate. Conversely, a negative demand shock for firms employing young workers could increase 
youth unemployment and via multiplier effects also increase adult unemployment. Table 2.4  Fixed Year and Country Effects Estimates Correcting for Serial Correlation and Instrumenting for Youth Population Share with Lagged 
Births, Including Lagged GNP Growth Rate as a Cyclical Indicator 
Independent Variables 
Dependent Variable 
Lagged  Adult  Adult 
Youth/Adult  GNP  Growth  Unemployment  Employment  Hausman Test 
Population  Rate  Rate  Rate  (  p-value) 
A. Only including the lagged GNP  growth 
rate 
Youth unemployment rate  1.119**  -.018**  .08 
(.429)  (.004) 
Youth employment rate  -  .036  .003**  .91 
(.154)  (.OOl) 
B. Adding the other cyclical indicators 
Youth unemployment rate  .603**  -.005**  .661**  -  1.075**  .06 
i.219)  (.003)  (.045)  (.505) 
(.114)  i.001)  (.016)  (.199) 
Youth employment rate  -  ,030  .oo  1  -  .064**  1.285**  .48 
Note: N  = 293. All variables are expressed in log form. The Hausman tests are for the reported variables only (no dummies are included in the test). The 
data are from 1970 through 1994, although most of the countries do not have data for all of the years. The regressions include dummy variables that account 
for changes in the data series for some countries. Observations are lost relative to panel B of table 2.3 because of missing data on the lagged GNP  growth 
rate. The mean of the lagged GNP  growth rate is 2.715 with a standard deviation of  2.603. The results for panel B of this table without the lagged GNP 
growth rate, but using the smaller sample size, are qualitatively the same as the results in table 2.3. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. 
**Significant at the 5 percent level. Cohort Crowding and Youth Labor Markets  81 
effect of relative cohort size on the youth employment rate remains nega- 
tive, but small and insignificant. In panel B, we include adult employment 
and unemployment rates, as well as lagged GNP growth. The estimated 
effect of relative cohort size falls to .6 for youth  unemployment  and re- 
mains small, negative, and insignificant for youth employment. It is not 
entirely clear which estimates in table 2.4 are better. Our sense is that while 
the adult employment and unemployment measures are prone to endogen- 
eity bias, this bias is likely to be minor, and the bias from omitting vari- 
ables that affect labor markets but are not captured by lagged GNP  growth 
may be more severe. 
2.3.10  Results Disaggregated by Sex 
In table 2.5 we reestimate the preferred specification from the preceding 
analysis separately for men and women. Specifically, in equation (1) our 
youth unemployment and employment rate variables are now the rates for 
either  young men  or young  women. We  continue to define the relative 
cohort size variable for men and women together because (barring war) 
the fraction of the youth cohort that is one sex or the other is presumably 
stable over time and because we do not think that young men and women 
in the countries included in our sample compete in entirely distinct labor 
markets. The specification of the aggregate demand controls is perhaps 
more problematic here.  When we  use the adult employment  and unem- 
ployment rates, we use the rates for men and women together, so as not to 
confound different effects of cohort crowding on youth labor markets for 
men and women  with trends or changes in employment and unemploy- 
ment rates of women. Nonetheless, the adult rates could still have rather 
different relations with  the youth  rates for men and women  because  of 
changing trends, rather than because the cycle has different effects. As a 
consequence, we  also estimate specifications using the lagged GNP con- 
trol to capture cyclical effects. 
The results indicate that the cohort size effect on young men’s  unem- 
ployment is less severe than the effect on young women’s unemployment. 
In the specifications using adult employment and unemployment  rates as 
controls, we actually find that only young women’s unemployment rises in 
response to a larger youth cohort. In the specifications with  the lagged 
GNP control,  there are sizable effects for  both young men  and young 
women, although the effect is still considerably larger for women. For nei- 
ther sex do  we find much effect on the youth employment rate. 
These results suggest that young women bear a disproportionate burden 
of unemployment when youth cohorts are large.22  One interpretation of 
22. We obtain the same qualitative result whether or not we instrument for relative cohort 
size, and whether or not we correct for serial correlation. Table 2.5  Fixed Year and Country Effects Estimates Correcting for Serial Correlation and Instrumenting for Youth Population Share with Lagged 
Births, by Sex 
Independent Variables 
Adult  Adult  Lagged 
Youth/Adult  Unemployment  Employment  GNP  Growth  Hausman Test 
Dependent Variable  Population  Rate  Rate  Rate  (  p-value) 
A. Men 
Youth unemployment rate  .I23  .827**  -  ,466  .35 
(.228)  (.049)  (.582) 
(.119)  (.017)  (.228) 
Youth employment rate  -  ,008  -  .074**  1.058**  .31 
Youth unemployment rate  .836*  .I2 
(.474) 
Youth employment rate  ,046  .82 
(.166) 
B. Women 
Youth unemployment rate  .899**  .09 
(.221) 
Youth employment rate  -.I42  .01 
(.104) 
(.408)  (.004) 
Youth unemployment rate  I .435**  -  .013**  .04 
Youth employment rate  -.I42  .002*  .09 
(.159)  (.001) 
.568** 
(.045) 
-  .023* 
(.013) 








Note: N  = 318 in the first two rows of panels A and B. N  = 293 in the second two rows. Observations are lost because of incomplete data on lagged GNP 
growth rate. All variables are expressed in log form. The Hausman tests are for the reported variables only (no dummies are included in the test). The data 
are from 1970 through 1994, although most of the countries do not have data for all of the years. The regressions include dummy variables that account for 
changes in the data series for some countries. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. 
*Significant at the 10 percent level. 
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this result is that employers tend to hire young men first and turn to young 
women when supply conditions are tight. Another possibility is that labor 
markets and marriage markets interact. When cohort size rises, because 
women tend to marry slightly older men, marriage rates for women may 
fall, leading to higher labor force participation rates for women that could, 
in principle at least, raise their unemployment  rate but not their employ- 
ment rate. For men, in contrast, this channel  of influence of cohort size 
would not  operate because of the weaker connection between  marriage 
and labor force participation.  While we  regard the differences by  sex as 
interesting, in the ensuing analysis we continue to look at all young work- 
ers together since from a policy perspective the overall effects of popula- 
tion  changes  on youth  labor markets may be of  most  interest. But sex 
differences in cohort crowding effects merit further research. 
2.3.1  1  Variations in Specifying the Effects of Cohort Crowding 
As discussed earlier, it is possible that the effects of relative cohort size 
on employment and unemployment of youths vary over the business cycle, 
with large youth cohorts having a more depressing effect on youth labor 
markets when  overall labor markets are slack. To  address this issue, we 
estimate augmented specifications of the form 
(2)  YE,  =  RCS,,P + AE,,y + RCS,, . AE,,y’ + D,,6 + E,,, 
where the adult unemployment rate is interacted with relative cohort size. 
The hypothesis is that y’ is negative in the employment rate regression, so 
that the youth employment rate falls by more in response to a large cohort 
in a slack labor market, and similarly that 7’ is positive in the unemploy- 
ment rate regression. 
The results for equation  (2) are reported  in  table 2.6.23  Although  the 
estimated coefficients of the population  share/adult unemployment  rate 
interactions are statistically significant (at the 5 or 10 percent level) for 
both the unemployment  and employment rate regressions,  the signs are 
not as expected. For example, the estimates  suggest that the effect of a 
large youth cohort in raising youth  unemployment  is lower when  adult 
unemployment  is high. (Note that this does not imply that youth unem- 
ployment is lower, because a higher adult unemployment rate is also asso- 
ciated with higher youth unemployment.)  One possible interpretation of 
this finding is that periods of high unemployment  generally are charac- 
terized  by high rates of job destruction (Davis,  Haltiwanger,  and Schuh 
23. We instrument by forming the fitted value of the relative cohort size variable, and using 
this variable and its interaction with the adult unemployment rate as instruments for relative 
cohort size and its interaction with the adult unemployment  rate. This is the method of 
“internal instruments” (Bowden and Turkington 1984). Table 2.6  Fixed Year and Country Effects Estimates Correcting for Serial Correlation and Instrumenting for Youth Population Share with Lagged 
Births, Including Interactions of Adult Unemployment Rate 
Dependent Variable 
Independent Variables 
Interaction  Adult  Adult 
Population  Population Share  Rate  Rate  (p-value) 
Youth/Adult  with Youth  Unemployment  Employment  Hausman Test 
Youth unemployment rate 
Youth employment rate 
.626**  -.399** 
(.204)  (.I%) 
-  ,082  .095* 
(.104)  (.053) 
.304*  -.843*  .II 
,041  1.314**  .05 
(.160)  (.484) 
(.054)  (.187) 
Note: N  = 318. All variables are expressed in log form. The Hausman tests are for the reported variables only (no dummies are included in the test). The 
data are from 1970 through 1994, although most of the countries do not have data for all of the years. The regressions include dummy variables that account 
for changes in the data series for some countries. The youth population share is  interacted with (adult unemployment rate -  mean adult unemployment 
rate). Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. 
*Significant at the 10 percent level. 
**Significant at the 5 percent level. Cohort Crowding and Youth Labor Markets  85 
1996), which  lead  to relatively more openings for young workers to be 
hired than would otherwise be the case.24 
2.3.12  Incorporating Enrollment Rates 
Earlier, we discussed the potential confounding influence of changes in 
school enrollment rates, noting that there was evidence that youth enroll- 
ment rates rose the most in countries with sharp declines in youth employ- 
ment rates, and raising the possibility  that exogenous changes in factors 
influencing enrollment rates help to explain the failure of the results for 
youth employment rates to conform to the cohort crowding hypothesis. 
Table 2.7 touches briefly on this evidence in the regression context, re- 
porting estimates of  our preferred  specifications  for the countries  and 
years for which enrollment data are available and then adding the enroll- 
ment rate as a control.25  The evidence in table 2.7 has two important limi- 
tations. First, the sample is much smaller because we lose countries as well 
as years. This may underlie the differences in the estimated coefficients of 
the relative cohort size variable in the first two rows of this table, compared 
with the comparable specifications for the full sample in table 2.3; for this 
subsample, the estimated effects of relative cohort size are insignificant in 
the regressions for youth unemployment  and employment  rates, but the 
evidence is more consistent with an effect primarily on youth employment. 
Second, because enrollment may be endogenous and we  expect negative 
endogeneity  bias  in  the coefficient of enrollment, we  may  overstate the 
influence of enrollment on employment. Nonetheless, the third and fourth 
rows of table 2.7 indicate that the results are little affected by adding the 
youth enrollment rate as a control. As expected, its estimated coefficient is 
negative (and significant at the 10 percent level) in the youth employment 
equation. But the estimated coefficient of the relative cohort size variable 
is largely unaffected in both equations. Thus the intervening influence of 
changes in youth enrollment rates does not appear to explain the failure 
of youth employment rates to behave as predicted  by  the cohort crowd- 
ing hypothesis. 
2.3.1  3  Interpreting the Estimates 
On the basis of the results presented in this section, it appears that the 
most  reliable estimates  of  the average effects of  relative cohort size on 
youth unemployment and employment rates are similar to those found in 
panel B of table 2.3. While the estimated employment rate elasticity is near 
24. This may seem like a contradictory argument since there is most likely more hiring 
of young workers in periods of low unemployment. But we are conditioning on the adult 
unemployment rate and are therefore referring to a cohort sizelunemployment interaction 
net of the relationship between adult unemployment and youth unemployment. 
25. Again, for the eight countries for which unweighted enrollment rates are available, the 
results were insensitive to using the unweighted rates or the fixed-weight rates. Table 2.7  Fixed Year and Country Effects Estimates Correcting for Serial Correlation and Instrumenting for Youth Population Share, Including 
Enrollment Rate 
Independent Variables 
Adult  Adult  Youth 
Youth/  Unemployment  Employment  Enrollment  Hausman Test 
Dependent Variable  Adult Population  Rate  Rate  Rate  (  p-value)  P 
Youth unemployment rate  ,073  .700**  -.I92  .49  ,573 
(.421)  (.095)  (.691) 
(.284)  (.051)  (.377) 
(.422)  (.097)  (.  704)  (.126) 
(.250)  (.053)  (.386)  (.070) 
Youth employment rate  -.383  -  .098*  ,556  .75  ,683 
Youth unemployment rate  . I23  .696**  -.I97  -  ,029  .59  ,548 
Youth employment rate  -  ,343  -  ,075  ,604  -.130*  .99  ,603 
Note: N  = 120. All variables are expressed in log form. The Hausman tests are for the reported variables only (no dummies are included in the test). The 
data are from 1970 through 1994, although most of the countries do  not have data for all of the years. Figures 2.6 and 2.7 show the data series of enrollment 
rates available for each country. The regressions include dummy variables that  account for changes in  the data series for some countries. Numbers in 
parentheses are standard errors. 
*Significant at the 10  percent level. 
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zero  and insignificant,  the  unemployment  rate elasticity  is  about  0.5. 
Given the declines in relative youth cohort sizes that are projected to  occur 
in the near future in many of the countries in our sample, an interesting 
question is how much these demographic changes will contribute to low- 
ering youth unemployment rates. We also noted that adult unemployment 
rates were considerably  higher  in recent  years than in  earlier  years for 
many of the countries in our sample. Since the estimated elasticity of the 
youth unemployment rate with respect to the adult unemployment rate is 
high (0.7 in panel B of table 2.3), it is instructive to compare the conse- 
quences of declining youth cohorts for youth unemployment with the con- 
sequences of improved aggregate labor market conditions. We  focus on 
the  youth  unemployment  rate  because  relative  cohort size  appears to 
affect this rate and because, as indicated earlier,  the youth employment 
rate may be affected by enrollment decisions. 
We  present  such information  in two ways. First, in figure 2.12 we  at- 
tempt  to provide a sense of the relative  strength of adult labor market 
developments  and youth cohort size on youth  unemployment  rates.  In 
figure  2.12A, we  show estimated  year  effects  on youth  unemployment 
rates, first with no cyclical or demographic controls, then including a cycli- 
cal control, and finally including the relative cohort size variables.16 All 
specifications include year and country dummy variables and dummy vari- 
ables for changes in the data series. We define the year effects relative to 
the overall mean, rather than any specific year, as in Suits (1984). For the 
youth  unemployment  rate,  with  no controls the year  effects reflect  in- 
creases in youth unemployment rates in the early to mid-l980s, and again 
in the early  1990s. When the adult unemployment  rate is included as a 
control, the pattern changes somewhat. In particular, the year effects dis- 
play more persistently high youth unemployment rates during the 1980s, 
presumably  revealing more of the effects of  large youth cohorts. In the 
early  1990s, the positive  year  effects are eliminated  because  adult and 
youth unemployment rates rose  sharply together in many countries.  Fi- 
nally, when the relative cohort size variable is included, most year effects 
diminish further, suggesting that large youth cohorts raised youth unem- 
ployment rates in these years. However, most of the year effects remain, 
indicating that cohort size effects account for only part of the movements 
in youth unemployment rates that are common across countries. 
Figure 2.12B shows the estimated country effects from the same speci- 
fication. Relative youth cohort size explains relatively little of the persis- 
tent cross-country differences in youth unemployment rates. In contrast, 
26. To  focus more sharply on demographic changes  vs. cyclical effects, this analysis is 
based on a specification that includes only the adult unemployment rate as a control. The 
results for this specification were very similar to those including the adult employment rate 
as a control as well. A 
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Fig. 2.12  Year and country effects on youth unemployment rates 
Note: A,  Year dummies from table 2.3, panel B, unemployment regression. B, Country dummies from table 2.3, panel B, unemployment regression. 90  Sanders Korenman and David Neumark 
for many countries the estimated country effect shrinks considerably once 
the cyclical control is included. 
These results suggest that while declining youth cohorts may hold the 
promise of improved youth labor markets in the future, any such benefits 
are likely to pale in comparison with the benefits that might accrue from 
improved labor markets for all workers. Of course, this conclusion could 
be affected by the fact that in figure 2.12 we first include the adult unem- 
ployment rate and then look at the incremental effect of adding relative 
youth  cohort size; however, if  we  include the relative youth  cohort size 
variable first, the conclusion is unchanged. To make this point in a simpler 
fashion, we  next report projections of future youth unemployment rates, 
based on projected youth cohort sizes and alternative scenarios regarding 
future adult unemployment  rates. 
Projecting relative cohort size is easy because youth cohorts that will 
enter the labor market in the next  16 years have  already been  born, al- 
though immigration and other influences can intervene. The future course 
of the adult unemployment rate is more uncertain. We therefore present 
three simple scenarios: (1) Adult unemployment rates in each country re- 
main at their mean for the 1990-94 period (the most pessimistic scenario 
for almost  all countries). (2) Adult  unemployment  rates revert  to their 
means computed over the entire sample period. (3) Adult unemployment 
rates return to their means for the 1975-80  period (the most optimistic 
scenario for almost all countries). We regard the first and third scenarios 
as providing  plausible  bounds on the future course of adult unemploy- 
ment rates.27 
Figure 2.13 displays the projections for each country. In each figure, the 
plain solid line is the projection of relative youth cohort size (we show the 
projections  for the years 2000, 2005, and 2010).2x  The other three lines 
are the projected  youth  unemployment  rates for each of the three adult 
unemployment  rate scenarios. The figure indicates much bigger changes 
in youth unemployment rates associated with changes in adult unemploy- 
ment rates over the range seen in the past two decades than with the pro- 
jected  changes in youth  shares over the next  10 to 15 years.  Spain and 
Italy provide relatively extreme  illustrations  of this point.  In Spain, the 
range of variation  in future youth unemployment  rates given alternative 
scenarios  regarding the adult  unemployment  rate  is  much  greater  than 
that associated  with  the sharp projected  decline in  the youth  share. In 
Italy, the persistence of recent high adult unemployment rates would com- 
pletely offset the beneficial effects of sharply declining youth cohorts. 
27. The other issue  that arises is the treatment  of time trends in youth unemployment 
rates. The models estimated to this point include year dummy variables. In the absence of 
information on future trends, we simply project based on the year effect for the last year in 
the sample; however, as fig. 2.12A  shows, this year effect is very close to the sample mean. 
28. These were also displayed in fig. 2. I, although the scale is different in that figure. Cohort Crowding and Youth Labor Markets  91 
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Fig. 2.13  Youth unemployment rate projections using various averages to predict the 
adult unemployment rate 
The greater importance of differences in the level of aggregate economic 
activity is partly due to the higher estimated elasticity of the youth unem- 
ployment rate with respect to the adult unemployment rate than with re- 
spect to relative cohort size (in panel B of table 2.3). It is also partly due 
to the fact that the range of variation in adult unemployment rates is much 
larger  than  that  of projected  youth  shares; that is, even  though youth 
shares are projected  to decline in  many countries, the declines are too 
small to produce sharp reductions in youth unemployment rates. Portugal 
provides a good example: relative youth cohort size is projected to decline 
relatively dramatically, but the adult unemployment rate scenarios are very 
similar. The relatively sharp decline in youth cohort size from about .4  to 
.28 produces a decline in the youth unemployment rate of about 2 percent- 
age points to about 10 percent. Although this change is not negligible, it 
is small relative to the declines in youth unemployment rates that (in other 
countries) are associated with declines in adult unemployment rates. Thus 
the qualitative conclusion is that improving aggregate labor markets has 
much more influence on the health of youth labor markets than do even 
large reductions in relative youth cohort sizes. 
2.4  The Role of Institutions in the Response of 
Labor Markets to Demographic Change 
Having explored the consequences of demographic change for youth 
labor  markets,  we  now  turn  to the  interaction  between  demographic 
change and labor market institutions and policy. Specifically, we consider 92  Sanders Korenman and David Neumark 
whether the responses of youth employment and unemployment  rates to 
changes in relative cohort size depend on institutional features of labor 
markets that affect the flexibility of those markets. For example, in a mar- 
ket with relatively inflexible wages, the response of youth unemployment 
and employment rates to changes in relative youth cohort size should be 
greater. This hypothesis is of particular interest given recent attempts to 
increase labor market flexibility, especially in the European countries (see, 
e.g., Blank and Freeman 1994). 
While centralized wage setting and other institutions and policies that 
make wages less flexible may make absorption of large youth cohorts more 
difficult, associated institutions may improve the quality of entry-level la- 
bor, so as to offset adverse impacts on firms during baby busts. In particu- 
lar, countries with more centralized wage setting tend also to have institu- 
tions that support worker training (Lynch 1994). Employers in countries 
where institutions that support worker training are weak or lacking may 
have difficulty finding qualified young workers, particularly during a baby 
bust. Training may therefore help employers to offset any “numbers loss.” 
Perhaps it is not a coincidence that there appears to be growing interest 
in  training institutions in  the United  States at precisely the  time when 
young workers have become more scarce (e.g., Lynch  1994; U.S. Office of 
Technology Assessment  1990). 
We begin with rather broad brush strokes, examining differences in the 
response to population changes between the European countries and the 
other countries in our data set. Freeman (1994) details differences between 
labor markets in Europe and the United States; European labor markets 
are less flexible, in general, being characterized by stronger unions, higher 
income support for the unemployed, more generous safety nets, and higher 
mandated nonwage labor costs.2y  We therefore first estimate a specification 
similar to equation (2), but allowing for differential effects of population 
change in Europe, as in 
(3)  YE,, =  RCS,,P + RCS,, . EUR,P‘ + AE,,y + AE,, . EUR,y’ 
+ D,,  8 + E,, , 
where EUR is a dummy variable for the European countries and we allow 
for different responses of youth unemployment  and employment rates to 
the adult rates in the two sets of countries. If the European countries are 
characterized as having less flexible labor markets, we  might expect both 
29. On the other hand, Allen and Freeman (1995) caution against exaggerating the differ- 
ences in flexibility. They report some evidence that European labor markets are less flexible, 
manifested in less frequent movements between employment and unemployment. But they 
do not find evidence of less sectoral reallocation of labor in European labor markets. They 
also suggest that European labor markets became more flexible relative to the United States 
in the 1980s, compared with earlier decades. Cohort Crowding and Youth Labor Markets  93 
a stronger response of youth unemployment rates to large youth cohorts 
and a stronger response of employment rates (because wages are less flex- 
ible downward). 
Results are reported in panel A of table 2.8. For youth unemployment 
and employment rates, the results indicate little difference between Euro- 
pean and non-European countries. For example, the association between 
large youth cohorts and higher youth unemployment rates is positive and 
marginally significant for the non-European countries (with a coefficient 
estimate of .419), and the interaction for the European countries is posi- 
tive (.169), but not significantly so. 
We next attempt to identify some of the institutional characteristics of 
labor markets that might underlie the differences between European and 
non-European  countries.  It seems appropriate to classify countries with 
respect to two characteristics that may affect labor market adjustments to 
population change. The first is the centralization of wage setting, which is 
thought to be inversely related to the flexibility of wages (e.g., Bruno and 
Sachs 1985). Of course, centralization or lack thereof may have more to 
do with the flexibility of aggregate wage levels than with the flexibility of 
wages for workers in particular age groups or skill categories. The second 
institutional characteristic is labor market policies that may inhibit wage 
adjustments and the reallocation of labor, such as the support given to 
unemployed  or nonemployed  workers. For example, Burtless  (1 987) ar- 
gues that higher unemployment rates in Germany (and other European 
countries) are attributable to more generous unemployment compensation 
that allows workers to be more selective about the jobs they take. 
The industrial relations literature provides  classifications of countries 
according  to the degree  of centralization,  three  of  which  we  use  here 
(Crouch 1985; Blyth 1979; Calmfors and Driffill 1988).30  The first of these 
classifies countries as corporatist or noncorporatist  (with the former im- 
plying centralization), and the latter two as having high, medium, or low 
Centralization. The countries in our data set that are classified as highly 
centralized according to all three of these classifications  are Norway and 
Sweden, while Germany and Finland are classified as highly centralized 
according to two of the three classifications. In all three classifications, the 
United Kingdom, the United States, Japan, Canada, and Italy are classi- 
fied as having a low degree of ~entralization.~' 
Our  empirical  strategy  is  to compare  the  responsiveness  of  youth 
30. These are discussed in more detail in Blanchflower and Freeman (1992). 
31. The complete classifications are listed in table 2.8. Ireland, Portugal, and Spain are 
not included in these classifications, so they are omitted from the estimation. 
Blanchflower and Oswald (1994, chap. 7) review literature that tends to classify the United 
States, the United Kingdom, and Italy as economies with low centralization and Germany 
and Norway as economies with high centralization. Freeman  (1994), Card, Kramarz, and 
Lemieux (1996), and Leigh (1995), among others, also discuss the flexibility of wages but do 
not provide as complete a classification of countries. Table 2.8  Fixed Year and Country Effects Estimates Correcting for Serial Correlation and Instrumenting for Youth Population Share with Lagged 
Births, Including Interactions  with Various Groupings of Countries 
Independent Variables 
Interaction  Interaction  Interaction 
with Youth  with Adult  with Adult  Adult  Adult 
Youth/Adult  Population  Unemployment  Employment  Unemployment  Employment  Hausman Test 
Dependent Variable  Population  Share  Rate  Rate  Rate  Rate  (p-value) 
A. European countries 
Youth unemployment rate 
Youth employment rate 
B. Countries classified as highly 
centralized 
Youth unemployment rate 
Youth employment rate 
C. Countries with indefinite 
support 
Youth unemployment rate 
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,002 
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-  .024 
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(.468) 



















-  ,022 
(.017) 
,055  .I5 
(.946) 
2.000**  .20 
(.431) 
-2.599**  .99 
(.952) 
2.390**  .38 
(.296) 
-  I .639**  .83 
(.666) 
2.429**  .40 
(.254) 
Note: N  = 318 in panel A, N  = 196 in panel B, and N  = 299 in panel C. Panel A includes all of the countries. In Panel B, the highly centralized countries 
are Finland, Germany, Norway, and Sweden. Countries with a low degree of centralization are the United States, Italy, the United Kingdom, Canada, and 
Japan. All other countries are excluded from the regressions in panel B. In panel C, the countries that provide indefinite support are Finland, Germany, 
Ireland, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and Australia. Portugal is excluded from the regressions in panel C. All variables are expressed in log form. 
The Hausman tests are for the reported variables only (no dummies are included in the test). The data are from 1970 through  1994, although most of the 
countries do not have data for all of the years. The regressions include dummy variables that account for changes in the data series for some countries. 
Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. 
*Significant at the 10 percent level. 
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unemployment  and employment rates to population changes in these two 
subsets of countries. However, there are a few reasons to be cautious about 
the relation between centralization and the response of labor markets to 
demographic change. First, other institutional  features of labor markets 
may offset the effects of wage rigidity. For example, Leigh (1995) suggests 
that the Trade Union Confederation in Sweden sought centralized wage 
bargaining with wage equalization across industries and regions but also 
encouraged active labor market policies to increase the employability of 
workers at prevailing wages.32  Second, labor market flexibility may change 
over time. For example, labor markets in the United Kingdom increased 
in flexibility with  some of the reforms introduced  after  1979 (Cappelli 
1993), and Blank and Freeman (1994) describe numerous changes imple- 
mented in European countries to attempt to increase labor market flexi- 
bility  in the  1980s. Third, a priori classifications of countries based  on 
centralization of labor markets may not always be reflected in actual wage 
adjustments across skill groups and the like (Card et al. 1996).33 
We estimate an augmented version of equation (3) of the form 
(4)  YE,, =  RCS,,p + RCS,, ‘ HIP’  + RCS,, . A4,p”  + AE,,y 
+ AE,, . H,y‘ + AE,, . M,y” + D,,6 + E,,, 
where His  a dummy variable set equal to one for those countries classified 
as having a high degree of centralization and M is a dummy variable set 
equal to one for those countries classified as neither high nor low, so that 
the reference group is those classified as having a low level of centraliza- 
ti~n.~~  The hypothesis is that p’ is positive in the youth unemployment 
rate regression and negative in the youth employment rate regression. 
Panel B of table 2.8 presents the results. The evidence is consistent with 
centralization  leading  to considerably  stronger positive  effects of  large 
youth cohorts on youth  unemployment. The estimated difference in the 
effect of  relative cohort size on youth unemployment, between the coun- 
tries classified as highly centralized  and those classified with low central- 
ization, is large (the estimated coefficient of the interaction is .719) and is 
statistically significant. Looking at the youth employment  rate, the esti- 
mated coefficient of this interaction is not significant, although it is nega- 
tive as predicted.  Thus the evidence that centralization  of  wage  setting 
leads to larger responses of youth labor markets to population change is 
relatively strong when the outcome is the youth unemployment rate. 
32. However, Forslund and Krueger (1994) argue that Sweden’s active labor market poli- 
cies have contributed to higher unemployment. 
33. However, Card et al. compare the United States and Canada with France, the latter 
of which is not generally characterized as highly centralized according to the classifications 
described above. 
34. We do  not need to add the dummy variables Hand M to the regressions because they 
are subsumed in the country dummy variables. 96  Sanders Korenman and David Neumark 
There are a multitude of ways to attempt to classify economies in terms 
of other features that affect labor market flexibility. We focus in particular 
on the support provided to the able-bodied nonemployed,  which should 
be related to the degree to which fluctuations in cohort size elicit market- 
clearing wage movements. In particular, we follow Layard et al. (1991) in 
classifying countries according to whether they provide essentially indefi- 
nite support to these individuals (through a combination  of unemploy- 
ment insurance, supplemental benefits, and means-tested programs). The 
list of countries in our data set that do so includes Germany, Ireland, the 
Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Australia, and Finland.35  Because this 
list of countries is quite different  from the list  of countries with  highly 
centralized wage setting, we obtain independent information. We estimate 
a specification of the form 
(5)  YE,,  =  RCS,,p + RCS,, . Izp’ + AEJ  + AEI, . I,?‘  + D,,S + E,, , 
where  I is a dummy variable  set equal to one for those countries with 
indefinite support. The hypothesis is that p’ is positive in the youth unem- 
ployment rate regression and negative in the youth employment rate re- 
gression. 
The results, reported in panel C of table 2.8, are somewhat supportive 
of this hypothesis, as the signs of the estimates of p’ are consistent with 
expectations, but only the estimated coefficient in the youth employment 
rate regression (- .206) is marginally significant. 
To summarize, there is little evidence that European labor markets in 
general have sharper responses of youth employment and unemployment 
to fluctuations in the size of youth  The results suggest that cen- 
tralized wage-setting  institutions, and possibly  greater  support given to 
the unemployed, may inhibit absorption of large entering cohorts. How- 
ever, the evidence is  rather  weak  statistically  and is based  on relations 
estimated at the aggregate level that clearly need to be explored at other 
levels as well. 
Ironically, because flexible wages tend to  dampen the response of youth 
unemployment rates to fluctuations in the size of youth cohorts, increasing 
wage flexibility should not be viewed as a tool to help exploit the projected 
declines in youth population  shares in order to reduce youth unemploy- 
ment rates over the next 10 to 15 years; increased flexibility may directly 
reduce unemployment of youths and adults, but it weakens the relation 
between cohort size and youth ~nemployment.~’ 
35. For details, see table 6 and appendix A1 in Layard, Nickell, and Jackman (1991). 
36. The results reported in this section are very similar if we  do not instrument for the 
relative cohort size variables. 
37. Our evidence does not speak to the direct effects of flexibility on youth unemployment 
rates because the various measures of flexibility are country specific and fixed over time and 
hence are indistinguishable from the country dummy variables. Some measure of flexibility Cohort Crowding and Youth Labor Markets  97 
2.5  Conclusions 
In this paper  we  report  evidence from  a cross-national  study of  the 
effects of cohort crowding on youth unemployment and employment, us- 
ing data on most of the OECD countries from 1970 to 1994. The use of 
data from many countries, with a relatively long panel, offers advantages 
over the existing literature for reducing the influence of period and other 
cohort effects and for avoiding faulty inferences from strongly trended 
data. In addition, we consider a number of issues not addressed in earlier 
studies, including the potential endogeneity of relative cohort size mea- 
sures, augmentation of the model to allow for variation in the effects of 
cohort size over the business cycle, and the influence of labor market insti- 
tutions on the response of youth labor markets to demographic change. 
Our preferred estimates indicate that the response of the youth employ- 
ment rate to relative youth cohort size is close to zero. But they indicate 
an elasticity of the youth unemployment rate with respect to relative youth 
cohort size on the order of 0.5. 
We use our estimates to project the likely course of relative youth unem- 
ployment rates, since the model estimates suggest that projected declining 
youth population  shares in at least some of the countries in our sample 
should lead to lower unemployment rates for youths. All in all, the lessons 
from  the projection  exercises are fairly clear: falling youth  population 
shares should improve youth labor market outcomes over the next  10 to 
15 years in some countries-particularly  those with relatively high youth 
unemployment rates in which large declines in youth population shares 
are projected (Ireland, Italy, Spain, and Portugal). But even for these coun- 
tries, and even with an optimistic scenario regarding future adult unem- 
ployment rates, the projections never indicate a return to the lower youth 
unemployment  rates  seen in  the 1970s. Youth unemployment rates  are 
much more responsive to general labor market improvements than to de- 
clines in cohort size. In particular, in many countries a return to the tighter 
labor markets that produced the low  adult unemployment rates of the 
1970s and 1980s would do far more to improve youth labor markets. Thus, 
while changes in population age structure may yield some improvements 
in youth labor markets in some countries, more substantial reductions in 
youth unemployment will have to be generated from other sources. 
One source of improved youth labor markets over the long term may 
be institutional changes, especially in European labor markets, that will 
increase  flexibility,  allowing  cohort fluctuations  to have  greater  wage 
effects and hence smaller employment and unemployment effects. The evi- 
that changed over time would be required for this purpose, but the analysis of such changes 
is beyond the scope of this paper. For evidence on the relation between labor market flexibil- 
ity and unemployment, see Layard et al. (1991). 98  Sanders Korenman and David Neumark 
dence, while not strong, suggests that greater centralization of wage setting 
in  some European labor markets, and generous support for the unem- 
ployed, may increase the response of youth unemployment and employ- 
ment rates to cohort size fluctuations. However, while increased flexibility 
may have advantageous direct effects on youth unemployment or the labor 
market more generally, it does not offer any particular  advantage in ex- 
ploiting future declines in youth population shares. Again, improvements 
in aggregate labor market performance offer the principal means of reduc- 
ing youth  unemployment  rates.  Whether these  aggregate improvements 
can be  more  effectively encouraged  through supply-side  (institutional) 
changes or aggregate demand policies remains an open question. 
Appendix 
Literature Review 
This  appendix  reviews  the findings  of  recent  studies,  which  are  sum- 
marized in table 2.1 of the paper (along with some studies not discussed 
below). In general, recent  studies continue to confirm earlier  studies in 
finding effects of cohort size on relative earnings and employment or un- 
employment. However, this is not always the case. Few studies examine 
both employment and earnings. A few have  analyzed  longitudinal  data 
sources in an attempt to distinguish period  from cohort effects and to 
examine effects on age-earnings profiles, but they have yielded limited in- 
sight due to the short length of panels. 
Looking first at evidence for the United States, Flaim (1979) studies the 
effects of  demographic changes on the U.S. unemployment rate. Simple 
decomposition exercises suggest that 1 percentage point of a 2.7 percent- 
age point increase in the unemployment rate in the United States between 
1957 and 1977 is due to changing demographic (age and sex) composition 
of the labor force. Allowing interactions suggests that the “pure” effects 
of changing demographic composition are lower, the remainder being ac- 
counted for by positive interactions between changes in size and changes 
in group-specific unemployment rates (e.g., cohort crowding). Flaim also 
finds a positive correlation between the percentage of teens in the popula- 
tion and the gap between the unemployment rates of teens and adults. He 
predicted that the overall unemployment rate would fall about 0.4 percent- 
age point between 1977 and 1990 (from about 7.0 percent). In a follow-up 
study published in 1990, Flaim shows indeed that the unemployment rate 
fell by about 0.5 percentage point between  1979 and 1989 and argues that 
the decrease is accounted  for by  declining youth cohort sizes. However, 
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omy or for wage changes. One must wonder why, if supply shifts (smaller 
youth cohorts) explain  declining unemployment  rates,  youth wage rates 
fell relative to the wages of older workers in this period. 
Nardone (1987) shows that the early  1980s recession hurt youths even 
though they were a small fraction of the labor force. This finding seems to 
conflict with the results of Flaim, but it also underscores the difficulty of 
distinguishing period, age, and cohort effects. The present difficulty arises 
from a well-known age-period interaction: that is, labor market outcomes 
for younger workers appear to be more responsive to economic recessions 
than are outcomes for older workers (e.g., Clark and Summers 1981). This 
finding suggests that researchers should control for the business cycle even 
when  studying  relative  unemployment  rates  (or  employment  rates)  be- 
tween youths and adults. 
Fair and Dominguez (1991) predict that entry of large cohorts should 
depress wages of young workers, lowering labor supply if the substitution 
effect dominates the income effect in labor supply decisions. Estimates of 
a simple empirical  model indicate that the income effect dominates for 
men but not for women.)* They admit, however, that both cohort size and 
age effects could be contaminated by business cycle effects. 
Other researchers have examined  additional implications  of changing 
population age structure. Stapleton and Young (1988) note that U.S. baby 
boomers affected the rate of return to education as well as the average 
level of educational attainment. If substitutability between younger and 
older workers declines as education increases, the present value of lifetime 
earnings is depressed more for highly  educated workers  from large co- 
horts, reducing incentives to invest. This implies that the returns to  educa- 
tion and college completion rates would fall for baby boomers, while edu- 
cational attainment should increase for post-baby  boomers. They study a 
sample from 1973 to 1980 and note a decrease from 30 to 23 percent in the 
fraction of 22-year-old males who completed college, although completion 
among females increased steadily. They project  that college completion 
rates would rise in the mid-1980s  and continue to climb, as in fact oc- 
curred. 
Berger (1989) studies a sample of white males drawn from the March 
Current Population Survey from 1968 to 1984, arguing for the importance 
of accounting for position in the demographic cycle, in addition to  cohort 
size, in estimating the effect of demographic change on youth labor mar- 
kets. Members of large cohorts can expect flatter wage profiles, those sur- 
rounded by large cohorts can expect steeper profiles, and those in cohorts 
born just before or after demographic peaks should expect lower initial 
earnings but steeper profiles. Berger argues that larger cohorts will invest 
38. The implied magnitudes of the substitution and income effects are consistent with the 
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less in human capital because they anticipate low returns; young and old 
workers are poor substitutes ifthey  are highly educated, so the returns to 
education will be relatively low for members of large cohorts. His model 
assumes  static demand for educated labor.  In the  1980s and  1990s in- 
creases in the demand for educated workers may have swamped the effects 
of any changes in supply, although in some countries the entry of smaller 
cohorts may have contributed to the increase in the returns to education. 
Building on the work of Stapleton and Young, Berger, and his own ear- 
lier work, Flinn (1993) develops a model of cohort size and human capital 
investment. In particular, he examines the effects of changes in the number 
of “investors” on the returns to investment, assuming different cohorts are 
perfect  substitutes,  in  two models: one in  which  investors have perfect 
foresight and the other in which expectations  are static. The focus is on 
investment  in  on-the-job  training.  There  are  time-dependent  demand 
shifts such as trade or productivity  shocks. The cohort size sequence is 
known and the returns to  investment are given. Entrants maximize present 
value  of  lifetime  income.  All  cohort size effects are reflected  in the se- 
quence of rental rates for human capital, which are determined by cohort 
size and investment decisions. Cohort size perturbations have direct and 
indirect effects. Direct effects are those holding investment constant; indi- 
rect effects allow human capital to adjust. The model is calibrated with 
U.S. data on white male age distributions from  1880 to 2010 at  10-year 
intervals and average white male wages in U.S. manufacturing from 1925 
to 1985. Youths are aged 15-24. 
Results from the simulation suggest that the elasticity of own wage with 
respect to cohort size is negative but small. The reason is that increases in 
cohort size reduce the opportunity cost of investment,  which  serves to 
offset the lower returns. Flinn also predicts that being a member of a co- 
hort that “follows” a large cohort has a large positive effect on one’s wages 
because opportunity costs of investment decline with no decreased return; 
similarly, he predicts a large adverse effect of being on the leading edge of 
a demographic cycle because many highly trained workers will follow in 
the near future, driving down the returns to investment. The elasticity of 
wealth with respect to cohort size is negative (about -0.25  for own cohort 
size). Also, Flinn finds little difference between direct and indirect effects. 
Simulations suggest that wealth was depressed 20 to 30 percent for baby 
boomers (compared to a scenario of constant population sizes). 
A number of researchers have also considered evidence on these ques- 
tions using data from European countries. Zimmermann (1 991) examines 
the effects of aging and cohort size on age-specific unemployment rates in 
preunification Germany. He uses aggregate time-series data from 1967 to 
1988 on younger workers (aged  15-34)  and older workers (aged  35-54). 
Preunification Germany makes an interesting country study because there 
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cohort size due to high male mortality during World War 11. The effects 
of cohort size are larger in the short run than the long run, confirming the 
hypothesis of (at least partial) catch-up. In particular, he finds a significant 
positive  effect of cohort size on unemployment that appears to decline 
with  age, controlling for the business  cycle. Large  cohorts of  younger 
workers do  not affect the unemployment rates of older cohorts in the short 
run, suggesting a short-run adverse effect of cohort size on relative unem- 
ployment of youth. However, his estimates suggest that older workers, es- 
pecially males, may be hurt in the long run by the entry of a large cohort. 
Wright  (1991) studies cohort size and earnings in Great Britain. The 
sample is composed of male heads of household from the General House- 
hold Survey for 1973-82. Wright hypothesizes a greater impact of cohort 
crowding  for more  educated  workers.  Therefore,  he  conducts  separate 
analyses for three educational groups and 31  age groups, over  10 years, 
although  he does not create education-specific  cohort size controls be- 
cause educational attainment  is thought to be endogenous. Wright finds 
that the effects of cohort size are indeed bigger for more educated individ- 
uals. He finds some evidence of lower earnings in larger cohorts, but these 
earnings differences do not persist as the cohort ages. However, the period 
1973-82  may not have been  a good choice for the study of cohort size 
effects on the relative earnings of youth because of a modest and approxi- 
mately linear increase in the size of the young-old population ratio (where 
the young are aged 15-29  and the old 30-64;  Wright 1991, fig. 2). 
Hartog, Oosterbeck, and Teulings (1993) study effects of cohort size in 
a sample of Dutch males in 1979, 1985, and 1988, stratified by educational 
group. They find significant positive effects of cohort size on earnings and 
negative  cohort  size/experience  interactions,  which  are  significant  for 
workers with lower levels of educational attainment. These signs are the 
reverse of those found in other studies. Their table 8.9 presents a specifica- 
tion check. First, in a simple cross section, they do find a significant neg- 
ative cohort size “main effect.” Second, with experience and age controls, 
the effect is small, negative,  and not  significant. Third, when they  drop 
school and age controls, significant negative effects return. Finally, when 
they control for age alone, there is no significant effect. Hartog et al. note 
that the sensitivity of the cohort size estimates may be due to collinearity 
between age and cohort size in a single cross section. In his discussion of 
this paper, Wright (1993) comments that the reverse effects may not be a 
mystery because the authors neglect to measure cohorts’ positions in the 
demographic cycle. 
Schmidt (1993) examines population aging and unemployment in Ger- 
many. He does not consider relative wages because  “wage adjustment is 
hampered  by  a  strong monopoly  union” (216). In recent  years in Ger- 
many, there has been a reversal of relative unemployment rates, with those 
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adverse effects of large cohort size for a few age-sex groups. In particular, 
effects of cohort size on unemployment  are positive  and significant  for 
ages 15-19,  20-24,  and 55-59  (males and females) but not for other ages. 
This result is consistent with a cohort size effect on unemployment  that 
does not persist into prime working ages. Consistent with Flinn, Schmidt 
notes that two issues-the  persistence of cohort size effects and the effects 
on investment  in human capital-are  linked. He finds that  the relative 
wage structure is fairly constant but  notes that births are not the only 
demographic factor to affect the relative size of the labor force at differ- 
ent ages. 
Nickel1 (1993) examines effects of relative  cohort size on the relative 
wages of young men in Britain from 1961 to 1989. He carries out two sets 
of analyses: one for the general labor market, the other for the unionized 
sector. Both analyses suggest substantial adverse effects of cohort size on 
the relative wages of youth, controlling  for the proportion of youth en- 
rolled in school and cyclical demand factors. 
Klevmarken (1993) focuses more on the effects of population aging on 
earnings mobility. Age-earnings profiles should be sensitive to supply and 
demand shifts (see his figs. 7.1 and 7.2). For example, secular increases in 
productivity will lead cross-sectional estimates of age-earnings profiles to 
be biased downward. Entry of large youth cohorts will tend to steepen 
cross-sectional  age-earnings profiles. Klevmarken  reviews studies of the 
effects of cohort size on age-earnings profiles (Freeman 1979; Welch 1979; 
Berger 1985, 1989; Stapleton and Young  1988; Martin and Ogawa 1988; 
Wright  1991; Jonsson  and Klevmarken  1978; Tasiran  and Gustaffson 
1991; Murphy, Plant, and Welch  1988). The point of greatest contention 
appears to be  the extent of catch-up in  earnings  for members of large 
cohorts. Klevmarken in particular questions Berger’s (1989) results, which 
suggest that catch-up does not take place.  Murphy et al. (1988) find an 
“initial” (short-run)  elasticity of  10 percent  with respect  to cohort size 
that falls to 3 percent on a lifetime basis. Tasiran and Gustaffson (1991) 
find that wages of Swedish shop assistants are depressed by large cohort 
size but profiles are steeper. 
Klevmarken  conducts an analysis of  a Swedish panel data set for the 
period  1984-88  at two-year intervals. His relative cohort size measure is 
the weighted  average of own and surrounding age groups. He notes that 
immigration flows are large and poorly measured. He finds that all cohort 
size variables are insignificant and concludes that “another result,  sup- 
ported both by this and previous studies, is that earnings profiles are more 
sensitive to changes in demand than to supply side changes” (Klevmarken 
1993, 167). However, we  note that the models contain many interaction 
terms that make interpretation diffic~lt.~~ 
39. Borsch-Supan (1993) provides comments on the Klevmarken paper and remarks that 
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